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Abstract
The last years have seen a growing interest in collaborative systems like electronic marketplaces and P2P
file sharing systems where people are intended to interact with other people. Those systems, however,
are subject to security and operational risks because of their open and distributed nature. Reputation
systems provide a mechanism to reduce such risks by building trust relationships among entities and
identifying malicious entities. A popular reputation model is the so called flow-based model. Most
existing reputation systems based on such a model provide only a ranking, without absolute reputation
values; this makes it difficult to determine whether entities are actually trustworthy or untrustworthy.
In addition, those systems ignore a significant part of the available information; as a consequence,
reputation values may not be accurate. In this paper, we present a flow-based reputation metric that
gives absolute values instead of merely a ranking. Our metric makes use of all the available information.
We study, both analytically and numerically, the properties of the proposed metric and the effect of attacks
on reputation values.
1 Introduction
The advent of the Internet has brought new business opportunities and favored the development of col-
laborative environments. In particular, the Internet provides the basis for the development of electronic
communities where strangers interact with each other and possibly do business. However, these interac-
tions involve risks. For instance, in an eCommerce setting, buyers are vulnerable to risks due to potential
incomplete or misleading information provided by sellers [34]. Similarly, sellers are subject to the risk that
the counterparty in a transaction will be unable to honor its financial obligations. To mitigate those risks,
there is the need of a decision support system that is able to determine the trustworthiness of collaborative
parties.
Reputation systems are widely considered as ‘the solution’ to assess trust relationships among users and to
identify and isolate malicious users [28]. Reputation systems are currently adopted in commercial online
applications such as P2P file sharing [8], web search [9], electronic marketplaces [3, 15], and expert systems
[2, 16]. Reputation is a collective measure of trustworthiness based on aggregated feedback related to past
experiences of users. The basic idea is to let users rate each other and to aggregate ratings about a given user
to derive a reputation value. This value is then used to assist other users in deciding whether to interact
with that user in the future [21]. In the last years, a number of reputation systems have been proposed
to aggregate ratings and calculating reputation values; each system is based on a particular theoretical
foundation (see [18, 21] for a survey).
The quality of a reputation system is determined by how accurately the computed reputation predicts the
future performance of entities [18]. This, however, is difficult to achieve because some users can attempt
to manipulate their reputation and the reputation of others for their own benefit. Most existing reputation
systems lack the ability to discriminate honest ratings from dishonesty ones. Therefore, such systems are
vulnerable to malicious users who provide unfair ratings [34].
The issue of discriminating honest from dishonest ratings is usually addressed by reputation systems using
the so called flow model [21] as the mathematical foundation. Examples of such systems are EigenTrust
[23], PageRank [9], SALSA [26], and PeerTrust [34]. What makes them appealing is that reputation is
computed taking into account the feedback of all the users involved in the system, and the feedback is
weighted with respect to the reputation of the user providing the feedback. Flow models are often based
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User Ratings
Bob positive 1
neutral 999
negative 0
Charlie positive 9
neutral 991
negative 0
David positive 0
neutral 100
negative 900
(a)
User Ratings
Bob positive 100
neutral 900
negative 0
Charlie positive 900
neutral 100
negative 0
David positive 200
neutral 600
negative 200
(b)
Figure 1: Example scenarios. 1000 ratings given to Bob, Charlie and David.
on the theory of Markov chains. The feedback provided by the users is aggregated and normalized in order
to obtain a Markov chain. Thereby, starting from a vector of initial reputation values, Markov steps are
repeatedly applied until a stable state has been reached.
Unfortunately, the current state of affairs regarding this kind of reputation model is not very satisfactory.
First of all, those systems only provide a ranking of users rather than an absolute reputation value. Although
this can be acceptable in some applications like web search, it is not in others like electronic marketplaces.
For instance, a buyer prefers to do business with an honest seller rather than with the most trustworthy
one in a pool of dishonest sellers. In a scenario where health care providers are willing to use data created
by patients [32], the quality of the data provided by a patient cannot be assessed by only looking if he
is more capable than other patients to do good measurements; an absolute quality metric is required. In
addition, most of the flow-based systems ignore a significant part of the available information (e.g., negative
feedback). Consequently, the reputation values those systems return may be inaccurate.
To illustrate these points, let us consider an electronic marketplace where users can rate each other after
each transaction, as in eBay [15]. Here, each time Alice has a transaction with another user j (e.g., Bob,
Charlie, David), she may rate the transaction as positive, neutral, or negative. Let us consider scenarios
(a) and (b) in Fig. 1. From a reputation metric we would expect that Alice has almost neutral opinion of
Bob and Charlie and negative opinion of David in (a), and positive opinion of Bob and Charlie and neutral
opinion of Charlie in (b). However, if we apply the reputation metric proposed in [23] to these scenarios,
we have that in both (a) and (b) Bob has local trust value1 0.1, Charlie 0.9 and David 0. The formulas used
to compute these values will be presented in Section 2. Here, we just want to point out that the metric in
[23] is unable to distinguish between cases (a) and (b). This lack of distinguishing power can be risky for
users as it can mislead them in their decision whether to do business with other users. For instance, the
reputation value of Charlie computed using the metric in [23] in (a) can lead users to think that Charlie
is ‘very’ trustworthy while in fact he is not. These reputation values only indicate that Charlie is more
trustworthy than others (i.e., a ranking without an absolute scale).
Moreover, it is worth noting that in [23] negative ratings are discarded in order to obtain a Markov chain.
Consequently, it is not possible to distinguish between users that have (strong) negative reputation and
users that have neutral reputation. This can be observed by comparing the ratings received by David in
scenarios (a) and (b) of Fig. 1: although David received a large number of negative ratings and no positive
ratings in (a) and an equal number of positive and negative ratings in (b), his reputation value is equal to 0
in both scenarios.
Last but not least, the design of flow-based reputation models requires including a number of parameters
which intend to guarantee the convergence of computations. However, a comprehensive and exhaustive
study of the impact of such parameters on reputation values and how they can be used to protect the
systems against attacks has not been conducted yet.
Our contributions In this paper, we present a reputation metric that enhances existing flow-based rep-
utation metrics (see [9, 23, 31]) by providing absolute values instead of merely a ranking, and by not
discarding any available information. Computing absolute reputation values makes it possible to quantify
1In [23] local trust values indicate the opinion that users have of other users based on past experiences. Local trust values are in
the range [0, 1].
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the trustworthiness of users and therefore provides a measure to univocally compare reputations values.
This allows us, for instance, to distinguish cases (a) and (b) in Fig. 1. In the design of our reputation met-
ric, we study the effect of self-reference (i.e., a user who gives feedback to himself). We demonstrate that
our construction minimizes such an effect, leading to reputation values that are closer to intuitive expecta-
tions. We formally prove that the proposed reputation metric always has a solution, and that the solution is
unique. We also discuss several methods of solving the reputation equation numerically.
Our metric depends on a number of parameters: a pattern matrix, which stores the (aggregated) feedback
received by the system owner from the users about the interactions they had with other users (hereafter,
the pattern matrix is also called indirect evidence matrix), a starting reputation vector, which represents the
direct information known to the system owner about the trustworthiness of entities in the system, and an
interpolation parameter α, which serves as a weight for direct versus indirect information. We analytically
study the impact of changes in the indirect evidence matrix on reputation values. This study allows us
to analyze how someone can attack the reputation system by providing unfair ratings. In particular, we
analyze self-promoting and slandering attacks[18] as well as Sybil attacks[14]. To study self-promoting
(slandering) attacks, we assume that an attacker can manipulate reputation values by giving positive ratings
to users who gave positive ratings to him (negative ratings to the target) and negative ratings to users
who gave negative ratings to him (positive ratings to the target). We study the effect of Sybil attacks by
modeling an attacker who subverts the reputation system by first creating a large number of pseudonymous
entities, and then using them to influence the reputation value of a target user in a similar way as is done
for self-promoting and slandering attacks.
On the other hand, we assume that the starting reputation vector and the weight parameter are defined by the
system owner and cannot be modified by the attacker. We numerically study the impact of these parameters
on reputation values and analyze how they can be used to mitigate the effect of above mentioned attacks.
The analysis allows us to draw some guidelines for choosing the value of these parameters. The guidelines
are general and apply to reputation metrics that use similar parameters.
In this work we are mainly interested in the study of the mathematical model of reputation systems, rather
than in the algorithm implementing the mathematical model. Therefore, we assume throughout the paper
the existence of a central authority which collects all ratings and calculates the reputation of every partic-
ipating user. This assumption is in line with the approach proposed in [9] where a search engine collects
information about hyperlinks of several million pages and indexes search results on the basis of such an
information.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of reputation systems. Section 3
presents our metric and Section 4 discusses its formal properties. Section 5 discusses several methods
for computing the reputation vector. Section 6 evaluates reputations numerically for a number of attack
scenarios. Section 7 concludes and discusses directions for future work.
2 Reputation Systems
Reputation systems have been proposed as a mechanism for decision support in open collaborative systems,
where entities do not know each other a priori. Reputation is a collective measure of trustworthiness built
from user experience. A user’s experience consists of the events observed by that user. Events can be, for
instance, voiced opinions, that is opinions that are made public [31], downloads [23], or transactions [15].
Users can rate the behavior of other users on the basis of their experience. In particular, ratings represent
direct judgments of the behavior of users with respect to the perspective of the judging user. Those pieces
of evidence are aggregated in order to calculate the reputation of users. Reputation gives the extent to
which the target’s behavior is good or bad [4].
In [18] Hoffman et al. identify three dimensions of reputation systems: formulation (the mathematical
model), calculation (the algorithm implementing the model and actually computing reputation), and dis-
semination (the mechanism to disseminate the outcome). Here, we mainly focus on the formulation dimen-
sion, and on attacks on the mathematical model. The formulation of a reputation system includes a number
of aspects: information source, information type, temporal aspects, and reputation metrics. The source of
information can be subjective, i.e. the rating is based on subjective judgment like in [15, 31], or objective,
i.e. the rating is determined from formal criteria like in [9]. The advantage of using objective information
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is that its correctness can be verified by other entities; however, sometimes it is difficult to define formal
criteria that fully capture entities’ opinions. At the same time, subjective information makes it difficult to
protect the system against unfair rating, which lies at the basis of self-promoting and slandering attacks (see
[18]). A typical example of these attacks is the so called Sybil attack (see [14]), in which different entities
or multiple identities held by the same entity collude to promote each other. Another aspect of information
sources is observability. Here it is important whether the information is directly observed by the entity
calculating the reputation, or it is obtained second-hand or inferred from direct information. We call the
reputation value calculated from directly observed information direct reputation.2 Indirect information is
widely used in reputation systems to support a notion of transitivity of trust (see [9, 13, 22, 23]). Although
trust is not always transitive in real life [11], trust can be transitive under certain semantic constraints [22].
In this paper we assume that ratings have the same trust purpose (i.e., the same semantic content) and
therefore their aggregation is meaningful. We also do not distinguish between functional trust (i.e., the
ability to make a judgment about a transaction) and referral trust (i.e., the ability to refer to a third party).
As in [23, 34], we assume that a user trusts the opinion of users with whom he had positive transitions,
since users who are honest during transactions are also likely to be honest in reporting their ratings.
The type of information used by a reputation system has a considerable impact on the types of attack to
which the system is vulnerable. Some reputation systems (see [15, 23]) allow users to specify ternary
ratings (positive, neutral, negative); others allow only positive [9, 31] or only negative ratings. Although
systems that only consider positive values are robust to slandering attacks, they are not flexible enough to
discriminate between honest and malicious entities. Negative reputation systems are particularly vulnera-
ble to whitewashing attacks [18]; entities who receive a large number of negative ratings can change their
identity and re-enter the system with a fresh reputation [25]. Therefore, one of our requirements for repu-
tation systems is that entities should not be able to gain an advantage from their newcomer status. At the
same time, newcomers should not be penalized for their status. Here, the temporal aspects of a reputation
system play a fundamental role. For instance, some systems (see [9, 19, 23, 31]) do not distinguish between
recent and past behavior, whereas other systems (e.g., see [4, 15, 24]) give more weight to recent behavior.
For instance, in [4] reputation values are updated by aggregating the previous reputation value with a factor
indicating the proximity of the recent score to the past reputation, i.e. r(t)ij = r
(t−1)
ij +µ(d ij , r
(t−1)
ij ), where
µ is a function that determines how fast the reputation value rij changes after an event with rating dij .
A reputation metric is used to aggregate ratings and compute reputations. Several computation models have
been used: simple summation or average of ratings [3, 15, 16], Bayesian systems [20, 30], beta probability
density [32], discrete trust models [10], belief models [1, 19], fuzzy models [7, 29], and flow models
[9, 23, 26, 33, 31]. Flow models are particularly interesting as they make it possible to compute reputation
by transitive iteration through loops and arbitrary chains of entities. Here, we present the reputation system
proposed in [23] as an example of a flow-based reputation system. Each time user i has a transaction with
another user j, she may rate the transaction as positive (dij = 1), neutral (dij = 0), or negative (dij = −1).
The local trust value sij is defined as the sum of the ratings that i has given to j,
sij =
∑
transactions
dij . (1)
This aggregated feedback is then normalized in order to obtain a Markov chain. Formally, the normalized
local trust value aij is defined as follows
aij =
max(sij , 0)∑
k max(sik, 0)
. (2)
Normalized local trust values can be organized in a matrix [aij ] (the so called pattern matrix). In flow
models the reputation vector (the vector containing all reputation values) corresponds to the steady state
vector of a Markov chain; one starts with a vector of initial reputation values and then repeatedly applies
the Markov step until a stable state has been reached using the following equation
r(k+1) = αAT r(k) + (1− α)p (3)
2Direct reputation is also called subjective reputation [27] or local trust value [23].
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where r is the reputation vector, A is the pattern matrix, p is a vector of initial reputation values, and
α ∈ [0, 1] is a damping factor.3
Unfortunately, the current state of affairs regarding this kind of reputation model is not very satisfactory.
First of all, the approach itself has a drawback. In the Markov chain approach, reputation values need to
be normalized in the sense that they add up to 100% (2). The problem is that such reputation values carry
relative information only. Applying (1) and (2) to the two scenarios presented in Fig. 1, we obtain in both
scenarios that Bob has normalized local trust value equal to 0.1, Charlie has 0.9 and David has 0. This
is good enough for ranking, but when an absolute measure is required, the Markov chain approach fails.
Actually, one may expect that Bob and Charlie have a similar reputation value in the first scenario; also
that the reputation value of Bob in the second scenario is greater than the reputation value of Charlie in
the first scenario. In addition, when entities have a similar reputation value, it is impossible to see whether
they are all trustworthy or all untrustworthy. Suppose a scenario (i) in which Bob and Charlie receive ten
positive ratings out of 1000 transactions from Alice and a scenario (ii) in which Bob and Charlie receive
900 positive ratings out of 1000 transactions. In principle, Bob and Charlie should have neutral reputation
in (i) and strongly positive reputation in (ii). However, because of the normalization in (2), from Alice’s
perspective Bob and Charlie have normalized local trust value equal to 0.5 in both (i) and (ii).
Furthermore, implementations of flow models ignore a significant part of the available information: while
ratings are positive, negative or neutral, their aggregation ignores the negative values and maps them to
zero. For instance, EigenTrust [23] takes the sum sij of the ratings of all transactions between entities
i and j, and normalizes it with respect to the sum of all the positive ratings given by i (see (2)). As a
consequence, it is not possible to discriminate between users that have bad reputation and users that have
neutral reputation. Consider, for example, the local trust value of David in the two scenarios of Fig. 1: by
applying (1), we obtain −900 in (a) and 0 in (b). However, after normalizing using (2), we obtain 0 in both
scenarios.
Finally, the metrics based on Markov chains include parameters which aim to guarantee the convergence
of computations and to resist malicious coalitions (e.g., the damping factor α and the vector of initial
reputation values s in (3)). Unfortunately, the impact of these parameters on reputation values has not been
studied in sufficient detail.
3 Our reputation metric
3.1 Reputation model
Reputation is a collective measure of trustworthiness based on the judgment of a community. The users in
the community can interact with each other and rate the counterpart in the transaction after the completion
of the transaction. The reputation value of a given user is computed by aggregating the ratings that other
users in the community gave to that user and reflects the level of trust that they have on the user on the
basis of their past experience. In the remainder of this section, we discuss the rating system, the method
for aggregating ratings, and the metric for calculating reputation values from the aggregated ratings.
Ratings are collected by a central authority using a rating system. We adopt a rating system where ratings
are bounded to the corresponding transaction. Ratings can be positive, negative, and neutral; we do not
impose any restriction on the range of values of ratings.
The central authority aggregates ratings in order to compute the reputation values of all users involved in
the system. We assume that aggregated ratings lie in the range [0, 1] where 1 means very good, 0 very
bad, and 12 neutral. The restriction to [0, 1] does not affect the generality of the model: values lying in a
different interval (and even qualitative values) can easily be mapped to [0, 1]. In this way, all the available
information (including negative ratings) can be used in the computation of reputation.
A number of factors should be taken into account when ratings are aggregated (see [4, 31, 34]):
• the ratings a user receives from other users,
• the total number of ratings a user receives from other users,
3Note that α is different from the ‘α’ in PageRank [9], whose purpose is to modify the matrix.
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• the credibility of the rating source,
• the size of the transaction, and
• the time of the transaction.
Several aggregation methods based on (some of) these factors have been proposed. In [15] ratings are
aggregated by summing the positive and negative ratings that the user receives from other users. However,
it is well known that methods based only on ratings are flawed [12, 34]. Indeed, a user can increase
his reputation by increasing the transaction volume to cover that fact he is cheating at a certain rate. In
particular, the user can build a good reputation in small transactions and then act dishonestly in large
transactions [17]. To prevent this, an aggregation method should also take into account other factors like the
total number of the transactions in which a user is involved and the size of the transaction. In addition, some
existing reputation systems use threshold functions for accurate discrimination between trustworthy and
untrustworthy users [31]. In particular, the ratings provided by a user are considered only if the credibility
of the user is greater than a certain threshold. To discriminate between past and recent behavior, some
reputation systems update reputation by aggregating the previous reputation with a factor indicating the
proximity of the recent rating to the past reputation [4].
The following example presents a simple method for aggregating ratings that incorporates the ratings a user
receives from other users, the total number of ratings, and the criticality of the transactions. Intuitively, the
aggregated ratings are defined as the weighted ratio of the sum of positive and negative ratings averaged
over the total criticality of transactions. In the example, we do not consider the credibility of the rating
source because this factor is used later in (5) to calculate reputation values from aggregated ratings. In
(5), the credibility of a user is given by the reputation of the user. We refer to [4] for an example of a
time-sensitive aggregation method.
Example 1 Consider the electronic marketplace scenarios of Fig. 1. Let Vxy be the set of transactions
between users x and y, let q : Vxy → {1, 0,−1} be a function that returns the rating given by y to x for the
transaction and w : Vxy → N a function that assigns a criticality value to the transaction. The aggregated
ratings Axy can be computed as the sum of individual ratings weighed with respect to the criticality of the
transactions and then mapped into the range [0, 1] as follows
Axy =
1
2
+
1
2
∑
v∈Vxy
q(v)w(v)
∑
v∈Vxy
w(v)
. (4)
If we apply (4) to the scenarios of Fig. 1 (and assuming that all transactions have the same criticality
value), we obtain that the values computed by aggregating the ratings given by Alice to Bob, Charlie, and
David in (a) are equal to 0.5005, 0.5045, and 0.05 respectively, whereas scenario (b) gives 0.55, 0.95, and
0.5 respectively. These values are closer to what one would expect than the results of (2), namely 0.1, 0.9,
and 0 for Bob, Charlie, and David respectively in both scenarios. (Here 1 means very good and 0 bad).
The set of all aggregated ratings Axy can be organized in a matrix. We refer to Table 1 for the notation
used hereafter.
Definition 1 For n users, the aggregated ratings are contained in an irreducible n× n matrix A,
• Axy ∈ [0, 1] for x 6= y;
• Axx = 0.
Axy represents the aggregated ratings of user x from the perspective of user y. We impose that self-
reference are not included in the aggregation (Axx = 0 for all x). This choice is motivated in Section 3.2,
where we show that a nonzero diagonal has undesirable consequences in a simple toy scenario. In Sec-
tion 6.4 we present numerical results on the effect of self-reference.
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Notation Meaning
n Number of users.
[n] The set {1, · · · , n}.
r ∈ [0, 1]n Column vector containing all reputations.
s ∈ [0, 1]n The ‘starting’ reputation vector.
Axy ∈ [0, 1] Aggregation of ratings of x given by y.
α ∈ [0, 1] Weight of the indirect evidence.
e The n-component column vector (1, 1, · · · , 1)T.
` ∈ [0, n] The ‘norm’ eTr.
vi The i’th eigenvector of A.
λi The i’th eigenvalue of A.
λmax Largest eigenvalue of A.
vmax Eigenvector corresponding to λmax.
C The n× n constant matrix C = eeT. Cij = 1; Ck = nk−1C.
Table 1: Notation
To compute reputation, we employ a metric that is an adaptation of the metrics in [23, 31]. In particular, we
adopt the equation proposed in [31] (see (5)), which differs from the one proposed in [23] (see (3)) in the
moment when the normalization step takes place. In [23] normalization is done once at the beginning in
order to obtain a Markov chain using (2); then, starting from a vector of initial reputation values, Markov
steps are repeatedly applied until a stable state has been reached. Conversely, in [31] reputation values are
normalized with respect to the sum of all reputation values in the reputation vector (
∑
z rz in (5)) at every
iteration to guarantee that reputation values stay in the range [0, 1]. We differ from the metric proposed
in [31] in the way the indirect evidence matrix A is defined: in [31] A is symmetric (whereas we allow
asymmetry), and Axx = 1 (whereas we set Axx = 0).
We consider a system with n users. The central authority determines the trustworthiness of all users based
on his direct experience with them and the aggregated ratings.
Definition 2 Let s ∈ [0, 1]n, with s 6= 0, be a ‘starting vector’ containing starting values assigned to all
users by the central authority. Let α ∈ [0, 1] be a weight parameter for the importance of indirect vs. direct
evidence. We define the reputation vector r ∈ [0, 1]n as a function of α, s and A by the following implicit
equation:
rx = (1− α)sx + α
∑
y∈[n]
ry
`
Axy (5)
where we have introduced the notation ` =
∑
z rz .
Eq. (5) can be read as follows. If the central authority wants to determine the reputation of user x, it first
takes into account the direct information that it has about x. From this it computes sx, the reputation that
it would assign to x if it had no further information. However, it also has the aggregated data in A. It gives
weight 1− α to its ‘direct’ assignment s and weight α to the collective result derived from A. If it did not
have any direct information about x, it would compute rx as rx =
∑
y(ry/`)Axy , i.e. a weighted average
of the reputation values Axy with weights equal to the normalized reputations of all the users. Adding the
two contributions, with weights α and 1−α, we end up with (5), which has the form of a weighted average
over all available information. Note that (5) can be expressed in vector notation as
r = (1− α)s+ α Ar
eTr
, (6)
where e stands for the n-component column vector (1, 1, · · · , 1)T.
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3.2 Discussion of self-references
The quality of a reputation metric is determined by the accuracy of reputation values. Here, we provide
further motivation for our metric and, in particular, for the choice Axx = 0. We demonstrate that the
reputation values calculated by our reputation metric are close to the expected values.
The expression for rx contains a term α(rx/`)Axx, the as yet unknown reputation of x multiplied by his
‘self-rating’ Axx. We briefly investigate the effect of self-reference on our reputation metric. First we look
what happens when the diagonal ofA is not set to zero but to ζ ∈ [0, 1]. For large n and randomA one does
not expect a significant effect, since the diagonal consists of only n elements out of n2. (See the numerical
results in Section 6.4). We consider the following scenario, which we tailored to make the diagonal stand
out: Everybody agrees that only one user is reasonably trustworthy (let us call him user 1). Let ε  1 be
a small positive constant. Let σ be a positive constant of order 1. We set Axy = ε for x /∈ {1, y} and
A1y = b ∈ [0, 1] for all y 6= 1. We set sx = σε for x 6= 1. Because in this scenario all the users except
user 1 are treated equally, (5) yields the same reputation for all users x 6= 1, which we will denote as rrest.
A=

ζ b b · · · b
ε ζ ε · · · ε
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . ζ ε
ε · · · · · · ε ζ
 , s=

s1
σε
...
σε
 , r=

r1
rrest
...
rrest
 . (7)
From a good metric we expect that user 1 has reputation (1 − α)s1 + O(ε) and that rrest is of order
ε, preferably rrest = (1 − α)σε + αε. Substitution of (7) into (5) yields, after some algebra, r1 =
(1− α)s1 + αζ +O(ε) and rrest = ε (1−α)σ+α1−αζ/r1 +O(ε2). Clearly, our expectations are met only if ζ = 0.
One could argue that setting the diagonal of A to zero is not enough to remove self-references completely:
in the computation of rx the normalization factor ` = eTr still contains rx, i.e. rx affects the weights for
the computation of rx. In order to avoid this, one could define an alternative reputation metric t as
tx = (1− α)sx + α
∑
y∈[n]\x
Axy
ty∑
z∈[n]\x tz
. (8)
For large n and generalA, the differences between (8) and (5) are tiny. However, substitution of the special
scenario (7) into (8) gives t1 = (1−α)s1+αb+O(ε) and trest = (1−α)σε+αε. While trest is as desired,
t1 is not. There is a significant difference between t1 and the desired outcome (1−α)s1 +O(ε), especially
when b is large. As a special case consider s1  b, a situation where the central authority mistrusts user 1,
but all the users trust him. The authority does not want his result for user 1 to be influenced heavily by the
users, since their reputations are O(ε).
We conclude that the metric r works best when Axx = 0 is imposed, and that r is better than the metric t.
Here ‘better’ means that it more closely matches our expectations of how a metric should behave.
4 Formal properties
The implicit function (5) can be shown to have a number of desirable properties. In particular, for any
choice of α, s, A allowed by Definitions 1 and 2 there always exists a well defined, unique solution r ∈
[0, 1]n. This result is fundamental in collaborative systems in which parties rely on the reputation values to
make a decision.
In this section, we first introduce some notation and list a number of useful lemmas. We discuss the trivial
solutions for α = 0 and α = 1. Then, we present a proof of existence and uniqueness of the solution r
for the general case 0 < α < 1. Finally, we compute the derivative of r with respect to A. This provides
a way to study the sensitivity of the reputation metric to malicious changes in the indirect evidence matrix
(Section 6.5).
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4.1 Notation and lemmas
For a vector or a matrix, the notation ‘V ≥ 0’ means that all the entries are nonnegative. For other notation
we refer to Table 1.
Lemma 1 If r is a solution of (5) satisfying r ≥ 0, then r ∈ [0, 1]n.
The proof is given in the Appendix.
Lemma 2 For given α, s, A and a given ` ∈ [0, n], such that det(`1 − αA) 6= 0, there can exist at most
one vector r ∈ Rn that satisfies (5) and eTr = `.
Proof: Let ` = eTr. Eq. (5) can be rewritten as
r = u(`) := (1− α)
[
1− α
`
A
]−1
s. (9)
This fixes the vector r uniquely as a function of the scalar `. 
Given a solution r, Lemma 2 tells us that a nontrivial permutation of r cannot be a solution.
Lemma 3 (Theorem 1.7.3 in Ref. [5]) Let M ≥ 0 be a square matrix. Then M has a positive eigenvalue
λmax which is equal to the spectral radius. There is an eigenvector vmax ≥ 0 associated with λmax. For
x > λmax it holds that (x1−A)−1 ≥ 0.
4.2 The special cases α = 0 and α = 1
The case α = 0 trivially yields r = s. The case α = 1 is more interesting. Eq. 5 reduces to
Ar =
(
eTr
)
r. (10)
This has the form of an eigenvalue equation. The matrix A has eigenvectors vi, and eigenvalues λi. There
exist n solutions of (10), namely
r(i) = λi
vi
eTvi
, (11)
i.e. proportional to the eigenvectors of A. However, the Perron-Frobenius theorem for nonnegative irre-
ducible matrices (see e.g. Ref. [6], Chapter 2) tells us that only one of the eigenvectors gives an acceptable
reputation vector: vmax > 0. All the other eigenvectors have at least one negative entry. We are left with a
single solution,
At α = 1 : r = λmax
vmax
eTvmax
and ` = λmax. (12)
4.3 The general case 0<α<1; Main theorems
Multiplying (9) from the left with eT and then multiplying by a suitable constant gives
f(`) = 1 where f(`) := (1− α)eT (`1− αA)−1 s. (13)
This equation helps us to prove several important properties of our metric. First, we demonstrate that (5)
has always a well defined, unique solution in the general case 0 < α < 1.
Theorem 1 For α,A, s as given in Definitions 1 and 2, there exists a reputation vector r ∈ [0, 1]n satisfy-
ing (5). The solution is of the form r = u(`∗) with u the function defined in (9) and `∗ ∈ (αλmax, n].
Corollary 1 In the limits α→ 0 and α→ 1, (13) and (9) correctly reproduce the reputation vector for the
special cases α = 0 and α = 1.
Theorem 2 The solution in Theorem 1 is the only solution of (5) satisfying r ∈ [0, 1]n.
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The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2, and Corollary 1 are given in the Appendix.
The quality of a reputation system is determined by how accurately the computed reputation predicts the
future performance of entities even when attackers attempt to manipulate reputation values. The following
result allows us to study the effect of unfair ratings by analyzing the sensitivity of reputation values to
changes in the indirect evidence matrix.
Theorem 3 For fixed α and s, a small change in A affects r as follows:
∂rx
∂Azy
= α
[
`1− αA+ α
`
AreT
]−1
xz
ry. (14)
(Here [· · ·]−1xz stands for element xz of the inverse matrix.)
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in the Appendix.
Theorem 3 gives some direct insight into the effectiveness of attacks. First, we see that the effect of the
attack is proportional to α. Furthermore, if some user y wants to attack the reputation of user x, the most
obvious attack is to reduce the matrix element Axy , i.e. (δA)xy < 0. We see in (14) that the effect is
proportional to ry . Hence, the effectiveness of his attack is proportional to his own reputation. (Of course
this does not come as a surprise, but it is good to see intuition getting confirmed.) From this we see that it
is advantageous for him to improve his own reputation before attacking other users’ reputations.
Finally, from (14) we can also read off a less obvious attack strategy. The attacker y may also indirectly
attack x by manipulating Azy , where z is some other user. The effect of this attack is proportional to the
matrix element Exz := [`1−αA+ α`AreT]−1xz . In practice, user y’s attack on x could look as follows. He
computes Exz for all z, z 6= y. He picks a number of users z whose Exz have the highest magnitude. For
each of them, if Exz < 0, he causes a positive change in Azy , otherwise a negative change. Remark: This
reasoning applies for small changes of δA. In the numerical experiments (Section 6.5) we take a worst case
approach and allow the attacker to make big changes in A.
5 Computing reputation
From the structure of Lemma 2 and the proof of Theorem 1, we can derive a direct method (Fig. 2) for
computing r from α, s, and A. This algorithm first solves (13) for `, obtaining a solution `∗ > αλmax
(lines 1-3). The equation f(`) = 1 is a polynomial equation of degree n; this becomes evident if we write
A as A = QΛQ−1 (with Λ the diagonal matrix containing the eigenvalues of A, and Q the matrix whose
columns are the eigenvectors vi) and multiply (13) by det(`− αA):
n∏
i=1
(`− αλi) = (1− α)
n∑
i=1
(eTQ)i(Q
−1s)i
∏
j∈[n]\{i}
(`− αλj). (15)
The highest order on the left hand side is `n, and on the right `n−1. The algorithm first completely solves
the eigensystem of A (lines 1-2) and then solves (15), looking only for the unique solution `∗ > αλmax
(line 3). Finally, it substitutes that value into (9) (line 4). Theorem 1 guarantees that the outcome is a vector
in [0, 1]n.
1 {λi} = Eigenvalues(A)
2 Q = Eigenvectors(A)
3 Find `∗ > αλmax that solves (15)
4 r = (1− α)
[
1− α
`∗A
]−1
s
Figure 2: Direct method
1 r(0) = s
2 repeat
3 r(k+1) = Ar
(k)∑
z r
(k)
z
4 r(k+1) = (1− α)s+ αr(k+1)
5 diff = ‖r(k+1) − r(k)‖1
6 until diff < δ
Figure 3: Iterative method
An iterative method for solving (5) is presented in Fig. 3. This algorithm first computes reputation as the
weighted average of reputation values in A (line 3). Then, it calculates the average over direct and indirect
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evidence using α, 1− α as weights (line 4). The algorithm repeatedly computes the reputation vector until
it converges, that is, the difference between the new state r(k+1) and the previous one r(k) is less than a
certain threshold (lines 5-6). Notice that the termination condition corresponds to∥∥∥∥∥ (1− α)s+ α Ar(k)∑
zr
(k)
z
− r(k)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
< δ. (16)
In Section 6.2 we show numerically that the two algorithms find the same solution.
6 Numerical experiments
In this section, we assess the performance of our metric for different choice of the parameters α and s and
discuss how these parameters can be used to mitigate the impact of attacks on the reputation system. In
particular, we first discuss our choice for the A-matrix. We compare the performance of the algorithms for
computing the reputation vector r presented in Section 5. Then, we investigate the effect of α and s as well
as the effect of self-ratings on r. Finally, we discuss attacks and their effectiveness.
6.1 Generation of the matrixA
To study our metric, we simulate a characteristic marketplace scenario. Our scenario consists of a number
of users who can interact with each other and rate the party with whom they interact after a transaction.
In our experiments, we also investigate the robustness of the metric against different threat models which
describe typical attacker behavior. Threat models will be described in Section 6.5.
In order to simulate a realistic scenario, we generated random A-matrices as follows.
1. All non-diagonal elements of A are initialized to 12 . This is the ‘neutral’ value for users who have
not yet interacted with each other.
2. For each user i, a value τi ∈ [0, 1] is drawn from a triangular probability distribution σ(τ) that has
σ(0) = 0, σ(1) = 0, and a peak σ(τmax) = 2. The number τi serves as the ‘intrinsic’ trustworthiness
of user i. We have a group of experiments with varying τmax to show its effect and, otherwise, τmax
is set to 0.6 as the representative value.
3. We fix a number f ∈ (0, 1), the ‘filling fraction’. We randomly generate f(n2 − n) user pairs
(xa, ya), with xa 6= ya. These pairs represent past interactions between the selected users, where ya
judged xa. We set f = 0.3.
4. For each of the pairs (x, y) the matrix elementAxy is assigned a random value uniformly drawn from
the interval [max{τx − 0.1, 0},min{τx + 0.1, 1}]. This step simulates the fact that the judgment of
x by y is mostly determined by the intrinsic trustworthiness τx, while allowing for some noise.
We consider this set-up acceptably realistic for the following reasons. First, for large n it is unlikely
that every user has interactions with everybody else. Only a fraction f < 1 of the matrix gets ‘filled’.
Second, the direct opinion about a user is the result of interactions with him. Someone’s opinion about
x depends mainly on the behavior of x (whose intrinsic trustworthiness is modeled as τx), and also on
other circumstances, which we model as small-amplitude random noise. Our choice of a triangle-shaped
probability distribution for τ is motivated by the wish to keep the model as simple as possible while still
containing the necessary ingredients.
6.2 Comparison of computation methods
We implemented the algorithms presented in Figs. 2 and 3 in Wolfram Mathematica 7.0. It turns out that
the iterative method (Fig. 3) is faster than the direct method (Fig. 2) at the same level of accuracy. This is
hardly surprising, since the heaviest operations in the iterative method are the repeated matrix-times-vector
multiplications (order n2 times the number of iterations), while the direct method involves solving the
11
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In the pretrusted case we plot in the x axes the number of user pretrusted. The range
is from 20 to 1000 with steps of 20. The configuration of the experiment is the same of
the previous scenario, you can see in Figure 6(a) and Figure 6(b) (with exception of the
element r1 that in Figure 6(b) is plotted again).
6.4 Robustness Against Attacks
@ describe how A is mofified by attacker
Considering how is defined our model, the only way possible for a user to make an
attack is to change the matrix A. We show how tampering the matrix in particular ways
can influence the final reputation.
Self-promotion The target is to raise the reputation of an user or a set of users. We set
n = 500 and than we try several kind of attacks.
The first consists to set to 1 the reputation of all the users in the guilty set. We
calculate the reputation associated to one guilty guy from the point of view of all the
other users and than we plot the average. We try this for some values of α and some
different percentages of guilty guys.
The second attack consists to give high values to the users that gave hi opinions to
the attackers and vice-versa. As before we try with several kinds of α and percentages
of guilty guys respect to the total.
Slandering The target now is to decrease the reputation of a user. As before, we set
n = 500 and try the same kind of attacks proposed in the previous part. The only
difference is that now we want the opposite result, so we will set 0 in correspondence
to the victim (as first approach) and put hi values to users that give low reputation to the
victim (as second approach).
Figure 4: Logarithmic plot of the difference ||r1 − r2||1 between the t o algorithms, averaged over 20
experiments, as a function of α. From bottom to top n = 50, 100, 200.
whole eigensystem of an n×n matrix. We did a number of experiments where we solved r with the direct
method, using Mathematica’s default machine precision. This gave∣∣∣∣ ri − [(1− α)s+ α AreTr
]
i
∣∣∣∣ < 10−15. (17)
We did the same experiments (same A, α, s) with Alg. 2, with δ = n · 10−15. This δ is tailored to yield the
same accuracy as (17), as can be seen by comparing (17) to (16).
For n we took the values 50, 100, and 200. The number of required iterations is then typically 12 or less,
and decreases with growing n. For ev ry n and α we took 20 different A-matrices. Fig. 4 shows the
distance ||r1− r2||1 averaged over these 20 experiments, where r1, r2 are the solutions found by the direct
and iterative method respectively. Clearly r1 and r2 are almost identical.
The results presented hereafter were obt i ed usi g the iterative m thod.
6.3 Impact of the parameters
The objectives of this set of experiments is to evaluate the impact of parameter α and initial reputation
vector s on the reputation vector r.
The parameter α. Figs. 5(a) and 5(b) show ` and selected components of r as a function of α. The
linearity in these graphs is surprising, since we know from (5) that r is not strictly linear in α. (Close
inspection of Fig. 5(b) indeed shows that the data do not precisely lie on straight lines.) Yet r is quite close
to a linear interpolation between the α = 0 and α = 1 solutions,
r ≈ (1− α)s+ αλmaxvmax
eTvmax
. (18)
This result is independent from the choice of τmax as shown in Fig. 5(a). As expected, τmax has an impact
on the average reputation of peers within the system (`/n). Fig. 5(b) demonstrates how a pre-trusted user
(a user who has initial reputation equal to 1) can lose his leading position when α increases, as gradually
more weight is given to A than to s.
As we discussed earlier, α serves as weight for direct versus indirect information. Accordingly, the system
owner should choose the value of α on the basis of his confidence in the information he initially has.
Suppose, for instance, that he is confident that a user x is trustworthy, but his reputation rx turns out below
average. This may arouse suspicion that some malicious user is attempting to subvert the system. In this
case, he should select a low value of α to reduce the influence of the information provided by users on the
computation of reputation values. At the same time, setting α to 0 would make it impossible to capture
the dynamics of the actual user behavior. The study of the behavior of the components of r (Fig. 5(b)) can
assist the system owner to select α in such a way that x keeps his high ranking, while information provided
by users is still taken into account.
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Fig. 2. Dependence of the reputation vector on the α parameter.
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@ Make sure that this equation appears somewhere∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣(1− α)s+ α∑
z rz
Ar− r
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
≤ cn (14)
In this part we test how the reputation depends from the initial vector s. We consid-
ered two possible situation in s:
1. all the elements have the same value (s = (c, c, . . . , c)T )
2. some elements are pre-trusted, so their value is set to 1 and the others are set to 0
(s = (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0)T ).
As in the previous part, for both the cases we show in one graph the l/n value
associated with the final reputation and in another one the behavior of some ri. For
the first case we put in the x axes the value used in the si elements. We tested all the
values in the range [0.1, 1] with step 0.1 making 50 experiments with n = 1000. As
(b)
Figure 5: Dependence of the reputation on α. n = 500 and s = (1, 0, · · · , 0)T. (a) For every α, 50
random A were taken, and only the min., max. and average `/n are plotted. (b) One fixed random A. The
downward curve is r1. The other plotted components are those with the minimum, maximum and median
reputation at α = 1, plus two more in between.
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In the pretrusted case we plot in the x axes the number of user pretrusted. The range
is from 20 to 1000 with steps of 20. The configuration of the experiment is the same of
the previous scenario, you can see in Figure 6(a) and Figure 6(b) (with exception of the
element r1 that in Figure 6(b) is plotted again).
6.4 Robustness Against Attacks
@ describe how A is mofified by attacker
Considering how is defined our model, the only way possible for a user to make an
attack is to change the matrix A. We show how tampering the matrix in particular ways
can influence the final reputation.
Self-promotion The target is to raise the reputation of an user or a set of users. We set
n = 500 and than we try several kind of attacks.
The first consists to set to 1 the reputation of all the users in the guilty set. We
calculate the reputation associated to one guilty guy from the point of view of all the
other users and than we plot the average. We try this for some values of α and some
different percentages of guilty guys.
The second attack consists to give high values to the users that gave hi opinions to
the attackers and vice-versa. As before we try with several kinds of α and percentages
of guilty guys respect to the total.
Slandering The target now is to decrease the reputation of a user. As before, we set
n = 500 and try the same kind of attacks proposed in the previous part. The only
difference is that now we want the opposite result, so we will set 0 in correspondence
to the victim (as first approach) and put hi values to users that give low reputation to the
victim (as second approach).
Sybil attack This kind of attack is atypical because allow the attacker to create new
accounts and give new fake reputations, thing that is not possible to do in every context.
(b) (c)
Figure 6: Dependence of the reputation on s. n = 1000, α = 0.9, one (typical) fixed random A, s = c e.
(a) τmax = 0.2; (b) τmax = 0.6; (c) τmax = 0.9.
The parameter s. We studied the dependence on s in two ways: (i) We set s = ce, with c ∈ [0, 1],
i.e., the initial reputation given by the system owner s equally distribut d among all users (Fig. 6). We
repeated the experiments for different τmax values. (ii) We set s = (1, 1, · · · , 1, 0, · · · , 0)T, varying the
number T of 1s in the vector (i.e., the number of pre-trusted users). Fig. 7 shows several components of r
for these two cases. For s = c e, the linear behavior of r as a function of c is hardly surprising, in view of
the approximation (18) which is lin r in s. Fig. 6 als shows that the average reputation of peers within
the network increases with the increase of τmax. Case (ii) shows jumps as a function of T , and even the
ranking changes occasionally. This can also be understood from (18). When an extra user x is included in
the pre-trusted set, the main effect s a jump in rx of size ≈ 1 − α, wi h only mi or changes to the other
reputations. This result demonstrates that the effect of selecting pre-trusted users wrongly can be mitigated
by increasing α.
In summary, the starting vector s has a clear effect on the reputations r, which is well described by the
linear approximation (18). In particular, s makes r less sensitive to changes in A. The pre-trust that the
central authority puts in users is carried over (multiplied by a factor 1 − α) into the reputation vector r.
Some guidelines for choosing s are given in Section 6.5.
6.4 Effect of self-references
As discussed in Section 3, we set A’s diagonal to 0 to minimize the effect of self-references. In this section
we study what happens when the diagonal is set to 1 (the strongest possible departure from Axx = 0).
In our experiments, we create an A matrix for different n (from 10 to 500) and calculate reputation when
the values on the diagonal are 0 (obtaining r0, with norm `0 = eTr0) and when they are 1 (obtaining r1,
with norm `1 = eTr1). We use the relative change 4`/`0 = (`1 − `0)/`0 as a measure of the influence
of self-references. We performed 20 experiments for each n and for α = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9; for each set of
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In the pretrusted case we plot in the x axes the number of user pretrusted. The range
is from 20 to 1000 with steps of 20. The configuration of the experiment is the same of
the previous scenario, you can see in Figure 7(a) and Figure 7(b) (with exception of the
element r1 that in Figure 7(b) is plotted again).
6.4 Robustness Against Attacks
@ describe how A is mofified by attacker
Considering how is defined our model, the only way possible for a user to make an
attack is to change the matrix A. We show how tampering the matrix in particular ways
can influence the final reputation.
Self-promotion The target is to raise the reputation of an user or a set of users. We set
n = 500 and than we try several kind of attacks.
The first consists to set to 1 the reputation of all the users in the guilty set. We
calculate the reputation associated to one guilty guy from the point of view of all the
other users and than we plot the average. We try this for some values of α and some
different percentages of guilty guys.
The second attack consists to give high values to the users that gave hi opinions to
the attackers and vice-versa. As before we try with several kinds of α and percentages
of guilty guys respect to the total.
Slandering The target now is to decrease the reputation of a user. As before, we set
n = 500 and try the same kind of attacks proposed in the previous part. The only
difference is that now we want the opposite result, so we will set 0 in correspondence
to the victim (as first approach) and put hi values to users that give low reputation to the
victim (as second approach).
Sybil attack This kind of attack is atypical because allow the attacker to create new
accounts and give new fake reputations, thing that is not possible to do in every context.
Figure 7: Dependence of the r utation on s. = 1000, α = 0.9, one (ty cal) fixed random A, s =
(1, · · · , 1, 0, · · · , 0), with T pre-trusted users.
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Figure 8: Effect of self-rating. The averag change 4`/`0 as a function of n (for various values of α)
plotted on a log-log scale. The slope −1 indicates that4`/`0 ∝ n−1 for large n.
experiments, we determined the average change.
Fig. 8 shows the average percentage cha ge in ` s a functio of n. We observ that the magnitude of
the change is inversely proportional to n, and hence becomes negligible for large n. The effect of self-
references is non-negligible at small n. For n between 10 and 200, it varies between 20% and 1%. Fur-
thermore, we observe that r1 = (1 + α`0 )r0. This proportionality is explained in the Appendix. As a
consequence, `1 − `0 = α. Notice that this result is constant, independent of n. In contrast, `0 depends
on n linearly in most cases. (For specially crafted A and s, such as the scenario in Section 3.2, `0 may be
independent of n.) This explains the inverse-n proportionality of the percentage change4`/`0.
6.5 Robustness Against Attacks
In our model, we assume that malicious users can compromise the integrity of r only by manipulating A
(i.e., by providing unfair ratings). They can influence neither α nor s. Attacks on the computation process
and dissemination are out of scope in this paper. Whitewashing attacks are not critical, since new users get
neutral entries in A. We assume that A is publicly known. How strongly A can be manipulated depends
on the actual feedback aggregation method. This can be a slow and/or costly process, e.g. if it involves
feedback on transactions. In Section 4.3 we described the effect of a small change in A and discussed how
an attacker can exploit such changes to affect the computation of reputation. Here, we present some threat
models that are inspired on such a malicious behavior:
Self-promotion: The attacker’s goal is to improve his own reputation. He can do this by giving (i) positive
feedback to users who have given him positive ratings, and (ii) negative feedback to users who have
given him negative ratings.
Slandering: The goal is to ruin the reputation of a target x. The options are giving (i) negative feedback
to x, (ii) positive feedback to users who have given negative ratings to x, and (iii) negative feedback
to users who have given positive ratings to x.
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Sybil attacks: An attacker creates new accounts. These give positive feedback to him and to each other in
order to improve their reputation and ability to influence r. Then, a slandering attack can be launched
with the help of the new accounts.
Let t be the number of attackers. Without loss of generality we can group the attackers together and let
them lie in {n− t+ 1, · · · , n}. Then, A is of the form
A =

honest judged honest judged
by honest by attackers
attackers judged attackers judged
by honest by attackers
 (19)
Only the right hand part of the matrix can be influenced by the attackers. A Sybil attack enlarges A by
adding rows at the bottom and columns at the right.
Self-promotion experiments. The objective of this set of experiments is to evaluate the effectiveness and
robustness of the reputation metric against self-promotion attacks. Consider one attacker y. He modifies
Axy to 1 if Ayx > 0.5 and to 0 if Ayx < 0.5. (He tries to boost the reputation of those that have a high
opinion of him, and to reduce the reputation of the rest.) The effect 4ry of such an attack is shown in
Fig. 9. The plotted data are calculated for one random A, but we have performed many such experiments;
the presented results are typical for the whole ensemble of random matrices. We chose an attacker y with
ry < 0.5, i.e. a user with less than neutral reputation who actually needs the attack.4
Clearly the attacker has little effect; his opinion is only one of many. As expected,4ry grows with α, since
any change in A gets weight α in the computation of the reputation. We also see that the choice of s has
a nontrivial impact. In particular, the larger the (total) reputation that the system owner initially gives to
users, the smaller the effect of the attack. Both Figs. 9(a) and 9(b) show a nonlinear dependence of4ry on
the components of s. Note that the attack strength for c→ 1 is not the same as for T → n−1. In particular,
sy is not the same in these cases: in the first case the attacker has initial reputation sy = c, whereas in the
second case sy = 0. This turns out to have a noticeable effect.
In summary, the most effective countermeasure for mitigating self-promotion attacks is to decrease α. An-
other strategy would be to enlarge the set of pre-trusted users. It is worth noting that this result contradicts
the suggestion given in [23] to choose a very small number of pre-trusted users. However, if the attacker is
included in the set of pre-trusted users, the power of the countermeasure is reduced.
@————=======================————@
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Figure 9: Effect of self-promotion attacks. n = 200, single fixed A. The difference in the attacker’s
reputation is shown (a) as a function of c, for s = ce; (b) f r s = (1, · · · , 1, 0 · · · , 0) as a function of the
number T of pre-trusted users. (The attacker is not one of the pre-trusted users.)
4 An attacker with ry > 0.5 has a bit more effect (14), unless ry is close to 1, where no more improvement is possible.
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(b)
Figure 10: Effect of the slandering attack. n = 100. The difference 4rx in the target’s reputation is
shown (a) as a function of c, for s = ce; (b) for s = (1, · · · , 1, 0 · · · , 0) as a function of the number T of
pre-trusted users. (The attacker and target are not part of the pre-trusted users.)
Slandering experiments. Again consider one attacker y. His target is x. He sets Axy = 0, and also
makes the following modifications: for z /∈ {x, y} he sets Azy = 1 if Axz < 0.5 and Azy = 0 otherwise.
(He tries to boo t the rep tation of those who have a bad opin on ab ut x, and to reduce he reputation of
the rest.) The effect is shown in Fig. 10, with the dependence on s presented in the same way as in Fig. 9.
We observe that the effect of this attack is roughly ten times stronger than in the self-promotion attack. The
difference lies in the fact that the attacker y can directly manipulate Axy in the slandering attack, while
there is no such possibility in the self-promotion attack (Ayy is fixed). We studied the magnitude of the
direct and i direct compo ents f the sl ndering attack separately. The results (not reported here due to the
lack of space) show that the direct attack is stronger than the indirect one (≈ ten times).
It is worth n ting that the curves in Fig. 10(a) are almost flat, i.e. for s = ce the effect of the direct attack o
rx viaAxy is almost independent on c. We suspect (but cannot yet substantiate) that the c largely disappears
due to the normalization that is inherently present in the defin tion of the tric (and which is most clearly
visible in step 3 of Algorithm 2) in combination with the fact that all users, including the attacker, are
pre-trusted. In contrast, the curves in Fig. 10(b) are comparable to the ones for the self-promotion attack
when y is n t pre-trusted (i.e., sy = 0).
In summary, the countermeasures for mitigating slandering attacks are similar to the one for self-promotion
attacks. However, differently form the self-promotion attack, the inclusion of the attacker in the set of pre-
trusted users would make the countermeasure completely ineffective as shown in Fig. 10(a).
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Figure 11: Effect of the Sybil attack. The percentage of the target’s reputation reduction is shown as a
function of m. In (a) we fixed α = 0.9 and varied the number of pre-trusted users T . From bottom to
top T = 10, 50, 100. Before the attack, the target’s reputation is 0.56 for all these values of T . In (b) we
fixed T = 50 and varied α. (The attacker and sybils are not part of the pre-trusted users; the target is pre-
trusted.) Before the attack, the target’s reputation is 0.89, 0.74 and 0.53 for α = 0.2, 0.5, 0.9 respectively.
Sybil attack experiments. We consider one attacker y who creates n · m extra accounts (‘siblings’)
n+1, · · · , n+nm. His main aim is to decrease rx for some fixed target x. To this end, all the siblings give
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negative ratings to the target and positive ratings to each other and to y. This corresponds to set Axσ = 0,
Aσσ′ = 1, Ayσ = 1, where σ, σ′ > n and σ′ 6= σ. Furthermore, they gives positive ratings to those users
who have rated the target negatively and negative ratings to those users who have rated the target positively.
In our model, this corresponds to set Azσ to 1 for those z 6= x, y that have Axz < 0.5, and to 0 otherwise.
We started with n = 200 and in each experiment we increased the size of A by adding pseudonyms to the
set of users such that the pseudonyms make up between 0% and 120% of the original number of users. The
effect of the Sybil attack is shown in Fig. 11. Clearly the attack is much more effective than the slandering
attack in Fig. 10. As expected, the effect grows with the numbers of siblings. Notice that a very large
number of siblings is required to significantly reduce rx; at m = 1 (as many siblings as original users) still
about 40% of the target’s reputation remains.
In Fig. 11(a) we can see that increasing the number of pre-trusted users helps to improve the robustness
against Sybil attacks; however, the choice of the starting vector s has little effect on the attack. Fig. 11(b)
shows that α has a nontrivial impact. Indeed, with small values of α we give less weight to A and, as
consequence, the attack is less strong too. Finally, both figures show that the effect per added sibling is
strongest for m smaller than approximately 0.6, and for larger m saturation sets in; more and more siblings
have to be added to obtain significant effect.
7 Conclusions
We have presented a flow-based reputation metric for aggregated feedback. The metric gives absolute
reputation values instead of merely a ranking; it also makes use of all the relevant information without
discarding any part of it, leading to reputation values with better discriminating capabilities. We have given
a proof that there is always a solution and that it is unique. We have also compared different methods for
computing the reputation vector, and studied the properties of the metric numerically, focusing in particular
on how attackers can manipulate reputation values. We have analyzed the impact of the initial reputation
vector s and the weight parameter α on r. It turns out that the reputations depend on α in a surprisingly
linear way, although the equations are nonlinear. They interpolate between the known solutions at α = 0
and α = 1, with small deviations from a straight line. The direct information plays an important role (also
for the ranking) even when little weight is given to it.
We have also studied how these parameters can be used to make the reputation metric more robust against
attacks. The attacks can be direct (attacker y manipulatesAxy for target x) as well as indirect (manipulating
Azy for other users z 6= x). A Sybil attack increases the effectiveness. The most evident result is that the α
parameter has a much stronger effect on the robustness than s. Robustness against attacks and in particular
Sybil attacks is obtained by choosing a smaller α. However, a balance must be kept between resisting
attacks and making constructive use of the information provided by users in the A matrix. In particular,
α must not be chosen too small because there is a danger from choosing a wrong s. Setting a larger α,
the effect of choosing the wrong pre-trusted users is mitigated, as the choice of s hardly matters. This is
demonstrated by the jumps in Fig. 7, which have size 1− α.
In this paper, we have mainly focused on the mathematical model of the reputation metric. In particular, we
have studied its properties both analytically and numerically, which allows the specification of guidelines
for making the system more robust against attacks. An interesting challenge for future research is to study
whether those properties are preserved in the computation dimension, in particular, when there does not
exist a centralized authority computing reputation values, but the computation is distributed across the users
of the system.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Eq. (5) states that r is the weighted average of two vectors; the first of these vectors is s ∈ [0, 1]n; the
second vector is g := Ar/`. The weights are α and 1−α respectively. We have ga =
∑
b(rb/`)Aab, i.e. g
is the weighted average of all the columns of A, with weights rb/`; these weights are all nonnegative and
add up to 1. Hence, since Aij ∈ [0, 1], the g satisfies ga ∈ [0, 1] for all a. From the fact that both s and g
have entries only in [0, 1], it follows that their weighted average has the same property. 
Proof of Theorem 1
First we prove the existence of a solution. For ` > αλmax Lemma 3 tells us that (1 `α − A)−1 ≥ 0; hence
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f(`) ≥ 0. Furthermore, f(x) is a decreasing function of x on this interval. Next we use αλmax/` < 1 to
express the matrix inverse as a convergent Taylor series,
(`1− αA)−1 = `−1
∞∑
k=0
(α
`
)k
Ak. (20)
Each term is nonnegative, (Ak)ij ≥ 0. Next we use the bound A ≤ C, where C is the ‘constant’ matrix. It
has the special properties Ck = nk−1C (for k ≥ 1) and eTC = neT. This gives Ak ≤ nk−1C and allows
us to bound the inverse as follows,
(`1− αA)−1 ≤ `−1
[
1+ C
∞∑
k=1
(α
`
)k
nk−1
]
= `−1
[
1+ C
α/`
1− αn/`
]
. (21)
Using this bound, and eTs ≤ n and eTCs ≤ n2, we can bound f(n) as f(n) ≤ 1.
Next we investigate the function f(`) in the limit ` ↓ αλmax. The matrix (`1− αA)−1 has only nonnega-
tive components, and its component (` − αλmax)−1vmaxvTmax blows up. We have seen in Section 4.2
that vmax > 0. Furthermore, we have s ≥ 0 and s 6= 0. Hence vTmaxs > 0. We conclude that
lim`↓αλmax f(`) =∞.
From all the above it follows that f(`) on the interval (αλmax, n) is a decreasing function spanning at least
the whole range [1,∞), and hence has to intersect the value 1 for some `. This proves the existence of a
solution `∗ ∈ (αλmax, n] of (13), which implies that r = u(`∗) is a solution of (5).
Finally we prove that this solution satisfies r ∈ [0, 1]n. From Lemma 3 we know that (1`∗/α−A)−1 ≥ 0.
Substitution into (9) and using s ≥ 0 gives r ≥ 0. From Lemma 1 it then follows that r ∈ [0, 1]n. 
Remark: We have restricted ourselves to irreducible A in Def. 1. However, if A is reducible then in almost
all cases Theorem 1 still holds. For reducible nonnegativeA the Perron-Frobenius theorem gives vmax ≥ 0
instead of vmax > 0. The proof above hinges on vTmaxs > 0. This condition is satisfied as long as s is not
perpendicular to vmax. For instance, if s > 0 then automatically vTmaxs > 0. Furthermore, for s ≥ 0 and
randomly generated A, the probability of the event vTmaxs = 0 is negligible.
Proof of Corollary 1
In the limit α→ 0, (13) directly gives `→ eTs and (9) gives r→ s, as expected. The limit α→ 1 is less
straightforward. Let us write the decomposition of s into eigenvectors of A as s =
∑
i divi. Then, (13) is
solved by `∗ = αλmax + (1 − α)eTvmaxdmax (which has the correct limit `∗ → λmax). Substituting `∗
into (9) precisely yields (12). 
Proof of Theorem 2
From the fact that f(`) is monotonically decreasing, it follows that the `∗ given by Theorem 1 is the only
solution of f(`) = 1 on the interval ` > αλmax. Next we consider solutions `′ on the interval (0, αλmax).
In order for u(`′) to be nonnegative, it has to satisfy aTu(`′) ≥ 0 for all a > 0. If we can find a counter-
example then we know that u(`′) is not nonnegative. One counterexample is a = vmax. From (9) we have
vTmaxu(`
′) = (1− α)(vTmaxs)/(1− αλmax/`′), which is negative for `′ < αλmax. 
Proof of Theorem 3
Eq. (5) can be written as [r− (1− α)s]` = αAr. The first order part of this equation (linear in δA and δr)
is given by `δr + [r − (1 − α)s]eTδr = αδAr + αAδr. Gathering together all the terms multiplying δr
and δA, then using r− (1− α)s = (α/`)Ar, and finally isolating δr, we get
δr = α
[
`1− αA+ α
`
AreT
]−1
δA r.
In index notation it reads
δrx =
∑
zy
[
`− αA+ α
`
AreT
]−1
xz
(δA)zy ry. (22)
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We also know from elementary differential calculus that δrx =
∑
zy
∂rx
∂Azy
(δA)zy . 
Proof of r1 = (1 + α`0 )r0
Let us modify A to A′ = A + ζ1, with ζ ∈ [0, 1]. The solution of (5) using A′ will be denoted as rζ .
Thus we have rζ = (1 − α)s + αA′rζ/eTrζ . Next we try if there is a solution of the form rζ = kr0,
where k is some constant. This yields kr0 = (1 − α)s + α(A + ζ1)r0/`0. We use (5) to replace the
expression (1− α)s+ αAr0/`0 by r0. This yields (1 + αζ/`− k)r0 = 0. Since r0 6= 0 we conclude that
k = 1 + αζ/`0. Theorem 2 guarantees that the found solution rζ = kr0 is unique. 
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